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Limiting violence in India with its population of more than a billion people and its 
many languages, religions, castes and regional diversities involves a complex web of 
economic and political compromises. The distribution of rents to powerful groups is 
jointly determined by institutions and politics at the national level and political 
arrangements within each state. While the national institutional and political system 
sets an overall architecture for the distribution of rents, individual states have their 
own distinct political and economic arrangements. This diversity creates tensions 
between the centre and the different states, but the diversity at the level of states also 
explains how such a big country stays together at all. By contrasting the construction 
of the social order in two Indian states, Maharashtra and West Bengal, we explore 
how dominant coalitions can be constructed in very different ways within the overall 
architecture set at the national level. These differences in the ways in which rents are 
used to construct social orders at the level of each state also help to explain 
differences in economic policies and performance across Indian states. 
  
In terms of the LAO framework, India after its independence in 1947 had many 
features of a Basic LAO but gradually acquired significant characteristics of a Mature 
LAO. This is true at both the national level and in most states. But the transition 
conceals significant regional differences and many parts of the country have 
characteristics of a fragile LAO, often at the brink of intense insurgencies which 
sometimes break out. The Congress Party as an inclusive ruling coalition dominated 
Indian politics for the first three decades after independence from Britain in 1947. Its 
dominance came to an end by the late 1970s with a host of other parties including 
regional parties emerging that were able to construct alternative governing coalitions 
at the centre. The significant increase in the effective mobilization of political 
organizations outside the Congress Party can be described as a gradual move in the 
direction of a mature LAO. At the same time, strategies of national economic 
management also went through changes since the 1980s as older variants of industrial 
policy were abandoned and the types of rents in the economy changed as a result. 
 
The hold of the Congress Party and its ability to deliver stability in the early years was 
based on its inclusion of the most significant political coalitions within its fold and its 
control of significant rents as part of its industrialization and modernization strategy. 
As part of that industrialization strategy, rents were created through import protection, 
licensing and other policies to provide incentives to domestic entrepreneurs to invest 
in industry. Policy-based rents were also available to further a range of other 
objectives such as reducing regional economic differences, assisting small firms or 
reducing poverty. These multiple objectives allowed the centre to have considerable 
flexibility to allocate rents in ways that were being demanded by powerful 
constituencies. Effectively, rent distribution achieved political stability and created 
incentives for powerful constituencies to compete for these rents using the political 
structures within the Congress Party. However, the achievement of political stability 
had negative implications for the economic outcomes associated with these rents in 
India in the 1960s and 1970s. The significant political constraints on rent allocation 
meant that India could not achieve the same successes with industrial policy as the 
East Asian tigers. 
 
By the mid-1960s the exponential growth in the numbers of aspiring political 
organizers joining the competition for rents meant that Congress could no longer 
define the dominant coalition using the old methods. The number of political factions 
competing for rents within the Congress was growing rapidly and the failure to 
accommodate all of them to their satisfaction led to the coalition gradually falling 
apart. As a result the political system lost its ability to control violence at its fringes. 
The declining ability of the centre to allocate economic rents also made economic 
reforms necessary. The growing internal crisis of rent allocation was possibly a much 
more important determinant of the direction of reform in India from the 1980s 
onwards than the emerging international consensus on the need for liberalization. 
Sectors and firms that had already achieved global competitiveness did very well 
subsequently, but the reduction in centralized rent allocation was also associated with 
an increase in violence and instability at the fringes. 
 
We focus on two of India’s biggest states, Maharashtra and West Bengal, to look at 
some of the different ways in which LAOs evolved across India during this period. 
The LAO in each state has distinct features in terms of how the local dominant 
coalition distributes rents to stay in power. Maharashtra follows more closely the 
trends at the national level in India, with a growing fragmentation of state-level 
political parties and growth increasingly driven by business organizations that have 
already achieved high levels of sophistication. While this state is an industrial success 
story, a third of its population of close to 100 million fall below India’s official 
poverty line. The dominant coalition in the state was led by large and medium 
capitalists and rich farmers who were part of the ‘sugar lobby’. With the 
fragmentation of politics, public policies that could assist broad-based development 
have become even more difficult to organize. In contrast, West Bengal bucked the 
trends towards political fragmentation for a long time with its well-organized and 
more inclusive Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM) government. But the 
accommodation of elites from a large rural constituency led to the neglect of industry 
and built up problems for the party as aspirations for jobs and growth became harder 
to meet. Industry and business were not part of this dominant coalition, though they 
could operate by buying support for their organizations. Nevertheless, the unfavorable 
position of industrial capitalists in West Bengal meant that the state did not become a 
destination of choice for major industrial investments. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the economic and 
political development of India from independence in 1947 in terms of the LAO 
framework. The contours of the national story set the scene for looking at significant 
regional differences. The second section is the case study of Maharashtra. This section 
explores the organization of its dominant coalition and how it gradually unraveled. 
The third section focuses on West Bengal. Unlike Maharashtra, the very different 
construction of the dominant coalition here led to an agrarian focus for economic 
strategies. When this agrarian strategy began to run out of steam, this again led to a 
gradual unraveling of the dominant political coalition. The final section concludes. 
The variations in how the social order was constructed in the two Indian states are 
related to differences in their political organizations and also to differences in the 
organization of their economies and societies. The differences in the rent strategies 
underlying the LAO in turn had implications for strategies of development that the 
regional states followed. 
 
6.1 Characteristics of the Indian LAO 
 
Table 6.1 
Fragile/Basic LAO 
 (1947-48)  
 
• Violence marred transfer of power from the British leading to the partition of 
British India into India and Pakistan 
 
Basic LAO- Nehruvian period 
 (1948-mid 1960s) 
• First parliamentary election held in 1952 established Congress Party 
dominance 
• De facto basic order with well defined dominant coalition but other 
independent organizations could exist. 
• However central control of critical rents through centralized planning and 
licensing by the Congress Party defined the Basic Order: trappings of a developmental 
state 
• Helped develop industrial capabilities that India built on in the 1980s and 
1990s 
Transition period: Crisis of the Basic Order (mid 1960s to late-1970s) •
 Increasing redistributive pressures as economy grows 
• Failure to discipline infant industries, breakdown of developmental model 
• Indira Gandhi comes to power on a populist agenda and nationalizes banks 
and coal mining to strengthen Basic Order  
• Increasing authoritarianism as Congress dominance is challenged by other 
political contenders in competition for rents 
• Culminates in the Emergency of 1975 
 
Evolution of an LAO with characteristics of Maturity but also Vulnerability 
(Vulnerable Maturity) 
(Late-1970s onwards) 
 • Establishment of first non-Congress government at the centre in 1977, 
evolution of coalition politics at the centre and growing influence of regional parties 
•  Declining ability of the state to allocate rents from above, associated with 
increasing political fragmentation 
• Mobilizations based on ‘caste’ and communalism with right wing Hindu 
political movements for the first time in independent India 
• Secessionist movements in Assam, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir 
• Balance of payments crisis in 1991 
• Economic liberalization formally begins in 1992 
• New types of rent creation after liberalization driven by alliances of business 
and politicians  
• Increasing communal and political violence (secessionist movements, Maoist 
insurgencies)  
• Acceleration of economic growth but with increasing inequality 
 
 
The evolution of the LAO in India can be divided into three phases. The Nehruvian 
period that lasted from independence in 1947 till the mid 1960s. The dominant 
political coalition was well-defined during this period and India had many of the 
characteristics of a basic LAO. A transition period from the late 60s to the mid 70s 
when the basic LAO began to fall apart, and the emergence of vulnerable maturity 
from the late 1970s onwards, when characteristics of a mature LAO can be identified, 
but also characteristics of growing fragility at the fringes. Significant regional 
variations exist within India and our two case studies, Maharashtra and West Bengal, 
show why it is important to examine the LAO in India at both the state and federal 
level. The movement from features of the basic LAO to the mature LAO does not 
correspond neatly with an increase in the sophistication and complexity of underlying 
political and economic organizations. Some organizations have become more 
complex and sophisticated, but other complex organizations have become more 
difficult to sustain and some have retrogressed. 
 
6.1.1 The Nehruvian Period: 1947 to mid-1960s 
The Nehruvian period was characterized by an attempt to plan the economy using 
tools like the licensing of investment, protecting the economy from imports and 
controlling the use of foreign exchange. The political system was based on the 
dominance of the Congress as an inclusive organization. In the first parliamentary 
elections in 1952 Congress established its dominance. Led by India’s first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, it won 364 of the 380 seats in parliament. This was not a 
basic LAO in the sense that the dominant coalition did not actually control the 
establishment of all organizations, but the electoral dominance of the Congress and its 
control of rents meant for a time that organizations that did not toe the line were 
relatively easy to isolate and effectively weaken or destroy. This was therefore a de 
facto basic order where the ruling coalition was well-defined and had effective control 
over significant rents. But Congress hegemony in this sense was gradually declining 
from the very outset. 
 
The basic LAO at this stage was based on the effective central control of a number of 
critical rents necessary for setting up sophisticated organizations in the productive 
sector. India’s dirigiste policies included favoring several large sectors like 
engineering, chemicals, power and automobiles (Chatterjee 1997). Instruments 
including direct state ownership and the granting of industrial permits or licenses to 
investors created rents that were used to direct industrial development. In addition, a 
number of other rents were used for redistributive proposes. For instance, there was a 
growing share of public sector jobs ‘reserved’ for particular castes, the ‘small-scale’ 
sector was protected, privileges were provided for employees in the modern sector, 
and so on. The Congress Party initially dominated the central and most state 
legislatures. Its control over the allocation of this wide range of rents allowed it to 
sustain its dominance because it could ensure that powerful organizations supporting 
the party got a share of the rents, and those which fell out of favor had a hard time.  
This situation did not however last for very long. India’s social structure threw up 
successive layers of new organizers and political movements that persistently 
challenged the distribution of rents at any particular time. The redistributive rents had 
to keep growing or the centre had to punish organizations that were demanding an 
excessive share of rents. Both became progressively more difficult as the numbers of 
organizations grew and the centre’s relative power declined. This also affected the 
management of the potentially growth-enhancing rents that were being created as part 
of the state’s industrial policy to counter market failures. Infant industries did get set 
up but those that failed to grow could not be disciplined and their rents could not be 
withdrawn because any firm could always buy in the support of some political faction 
or other to protect their rents (Khan 2009). Growth began to slow down by the mid-
1960s. 
 
Despite being unsustainable, this period of relative political stability also saw the 
growth of complex organizations like centers of research and development, 
educational establishments and large industrial organizations using modern 
technologies. These included the Indian Institutes of Technology, set up by Nehru and 
now recognized as one of the main contributors to India’s eventual success in 
Information Technology, and early pioneering companies like Hindustan Antibiotics 
Ltd and Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd which laid the basis for India’s leading 
position in the generics market later. The first phase also helped to lay the foundations 
for future Indian multinationals like Tata.  
 
 
 
6.1.2 The Transition: mid-1960s to late-1970s 
The unraveling of the basic LAO in India was not a smooth process. Indira Gandhi, 
who was elected prime minister in 1966, tried to clamp down on the political interests 
that were mushrooming, many of which could not be accommodated within the 
Congress. On the one hand she sought to exert control within the Congress Party by 
tightening the system of internal patronage. On the other hand, where patronage failed 
she increasingly used harsh measures to exercise authority. Paradoxically as she 
became more authoritarian in order to preserve her position (and to sustain Congress 
control over the country) the stronger the opposition to her became. 
 
A number of Indira Gandhi’s agendas can be understood better from this perspective. 
For instance, the drive towards nationalization was partly motivated to make more 
rents available for distribution through patronage. In particular, the nationalized 
banking sector became the only conduit for large scale borrowing and lending 
activities. The monopoly Coal India Ltd, formed after nationalization, was another 
example of a nationalized entity providing significant rents for political patrons to 
distribute. The populist logic for nationalization was very likely to have been mainly 
window dressing for a policy driven by hard political calculations of generating rents 
for a growing number of organizations. 
 
These strategies were not enough to stave off the collapse of the basic LAO. India’s 
slow descent into chaos was marked by Mrs. Gandhi’s increasingly ‘jealous 
populism’ (Selbourne 1977), and her attempts at snuffing any opposition by using all 
the state machinery at her disposal. In 1975 Indira declared an Emergency which was 
effectively a suspension of electoral democracy. This was an attempt at enforcing the 
basic LAO by an exercise of authoritarian restrictions on organization, and has strong 
parallels with similar populist-authoritarian experiments in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
at that time. Power was centralized in New Delhi and opposition state governments 
were dismissed. A significant number of rents were now allocated not just by the 
Congress Party but by the Gandhi family through its control of the party’s finances 
(Chatterjee 1997). Planning and financing of campaigns by local Congress Party 
organizations was discouraged. The attempt to institutionalize a basic LAO thus 
happened at the very time that it was becoming unsustainable as a result of changes in 
the number and capabilities of organizations. 
 
Mrs. Gandhi called fresh elections in 1977 in a move to ‘legitimize’ the new populist 
authoritarian version of the basic LAO. She believed that electoral support for her 
populist policies would override the opposition she faced from organizations of 
competing elites and that the voters below would keep her in power on the grounds 
that they had nothing much to gain from the organizations that were challenging 
central authority. For the first time the Congress reached out directly to voters without 
attempting to construct a coalition of elite interests backing the party. The result was a 
resounding electoral defeat and the replacement of the Congress by the Janata Party, a 
coalition of four opposition parties. There is a remarkable parallel in the turn to 
populist authoritarianism in the mid-1970s and its failure across India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi, Bhutto and Mujib would all be remembered for their 
failed attempts to institutionalize authoritarian versions of ‘socialism’ based on 
controls over the organizational freedoms of critical and powerful organizations 
(Khan 2008c). All three leaders also paid a heavy political and personal price for their 
brand of politics: all three were eventually assassinated or executed. 
 
6.1.3 Vulnerable Maturity: Late-1970s Onwards 
The failure of the authoritarian attempt at institutionalizing a basic LAO gradually led 
to a much greater openness for new economic and political organizations to form 
outside the Congress. This had always been possible was increasingly uncontested by 
the ruling coalition. By the 1980s India’s LAO began to acquire some significant 
characteristics that resembled a mature LAO. The ability of the ruling coalition to 
control the political organizations it had created declined dramatically. Indeed, to 
challenge and balance political organizations that were in confrontation with the 
Congress and other parties at the centre, the latter increasingly resorted to a strategy 
of patronizing new political organizations to ‘divide and rule’. The new organizations 
in turn could no longer be as tightly controlled by the Congress as they may have been 
during the days of the Basic LAO.  This period also saw the beginning of coalition 
politics at the centre, as no party including the Congress could rule on its own. Since 
1989, barring one instance in 1991, no single party has been able to rule for the term 
of five years on its own. Nor have the two principal national parties—the Congress 
and the BJP—been able to form a government on their own without the support of 
smaller regional parties.  
 
India’s transition from a basic LAO to one with characteristics of a mature LAO has 
many similarities with its subcontinental neighbors, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The 
turn towards authoritarianism in the 1970s was a common feature in all three 
countries, and their trajectories since then have in many ways been similar, though the 
higher economic growth in India has tended to overshadow the very dynamic and 
evolving economies of the two other countries in the region. In fact, there were 
growth accelerations in all three countries in the 1980s (Khan 2008). The general 
consensus in the economic literature is to link the growth takeoff, particularly in 
India, to the onset of liberalization (Basu 2003, Panagariya, 2005). While some 
aspects of liberalization were undoubtedly important, our analysis suggests that the 
years of protection in all three countries were critical in building entrepreneurial and 
technical capabilities as well as organizational capabilities that eventually enabled 
some businessmen to break free from the state and establish their own productive 
enterprises. This allowed pockets of global competitiveness to emerge across the 
subcontinent. India’s auto, information technology and software industries are part of 
a spectrum that includes, for instance, garments and textiles and even ship building in 
Bangladesh, and the power loom textile sector and small consumer durables in 
Pakistan (Khan 2008b).  
 
Politics on the other hand has become more competitive and redistributive rents 
appear to be growing. Just as economic organizations have become more 
sophisticated, so have political organizations. But the central states have fewer rents 
to allocate through formal mechanisms of managing the economy. Redistributive 
rents have therefore become even less productive as they are no longer part of 
operating industrial policy or regional policy but are directly captured by emerging 
political organizations in an increasingly fractious competitive environment. This 
reflects the earlier basic LAO breaking down in all the three countries. As the 
competition for rents became more intense, violence has also increased. The paradox 
of the LAO in India has therefore been the simultaneous emergence of aspects of both 
maturity and fragility, a combination that we describe as vulnerable maturity. The 
increasingly competitive organization of politics and the growing weakness of a 
central arbiter have allowed the structural exclusion of some marginal groups in these 
polities to be transformed into violent confrontations. The current Maoist and Taliban-
led insurgencies in India and Pakistan respectively can be better understood in this 
context. In both cases central elites have been unable to create rents for these 
segments of society and their exclusion has resulted in the formation of new 
organizations that are even more difficult to satisfy with the rents that are available. 
The result has been endemic violence at the margins of the Indian LAO, and even 
more so in Pakistan.  
 
In this context of increasing political fragmentation two other political strategies 
emerged during this period that contributed to the volatility of Indian politics. One 
was the movement to extend ‘reservations’ of public sector jobs to a wider range of 
defined castes. This began with the move by the National Front coalition of 1990 to 
‘reserve’ 27 per cent of jobs in the government for India’s Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) who make up about 40 per cent of India’s population. In the caste hierarchy 
they come in between the upper castes and the ‘untouchables’ who are part of the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes. This led to an increase in caste mobilizations and caste 
politics, as new groups demanded protection. This further deepened the characteristics 
of maturity as political organizations proliferated but also increased the levels of 
conflict and fragility.  The second was the emergence of ideological politics that 
attempted to create mass support for the ruling coalition without offering any 
significant rents by appealing to the need for national unity against internal and 
external enemies. Over 80 percent of India’s population is Hindu and Congress 
realized that appealing to Hindu ‘sentiments’ could attract electoral support that was 
cheap in terms of the rents that would actually be involved. But in doing so it laid the 
basis for right wing Hindu or ‘Hindutva’ politics that was aggressive against India’s 
minorities and in particular its Muslims, as a strategy of constructing support for a 
ruling coalition. This too contributed to making politics more divisive and increased 
violence in many parts of India. 
 
An important consequence of the decline of inclusive parties at the centre was that 
states became important theatres for local elites to create organizations and demand 
rents. The importance of controlling political power at the level of a state meant that 
excluded groups in many states often agitated for a smaller state to be carved out for 
them from the larger state. Thus, new states emerged out of bigger states, driven by 
the political demands of excluded groups. The overall level of political violence 
increased dramatically within India since the 1980s. The current Maoist insurgency in 
the central and eastern areas of the country is only one indicator of the significant 
fragility that exists in pockets within an otherwise increasingly mature LAO.  
 
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a continuation of these trends. The 
system of coalition governments at the centre has become an enduring feature of 
India’s governance. The ability and freedom to set up new political organizations and 
mobilize new constituencies has become well established. It was always a formal 
entitlement but now it is effectively exercised by many aspiring political organizers 
with the money and muscle to make the necessary investments. The most 
sophisticated organizations within Indian business have continued to grow and 
enhance their global competitiveness. The most aggressive Indian multinationals have 
not only penetrated markets in the west, they have also begun to acquire and operate 
corporate entities in advanced countries like the UK and Germany as well as in 
developing areas like Africa, demonstrating the growing sophistication of India’s 
corporate organizations. It is in this overall context of transition and maturity that we 
locate the differences in the construction of the LAO in our two states. 
 
6.2.2 Maharashtra 
Maharashtra is one of India’s leading industrial states, and its capital, Mumbai 
(previously Bombay), is India’s premier financial and commercial hub. Its key sectors 
include automobiles, pharmaceuticals, financial services and IT services. Apart from a 
relatively successful economy, the state has for long been characterized by high levels 
of political mobilization. The Congress ruled the state almost uninterrupted from 1960 
(when the state was created by partitioning Bombay Presidency into Gujarat and 
Maharashtra) to 1995. But in line with developments at the national level, the state’s 
politics has become fragmented and faction ridden through the 1980s with continuous 
horse trading among parties to form and operate a ruling coalition at the state level. 
 
The dominant coalition in the early years in Maharashtra (corresponding to the period 
of the basic LAO in India) was constructed in a way that allowed the creation of 
significant growth-enhancing rents as part of the political arrangements underpinning 
the LAO. These were rents that could be created for business leaders who were part of 
the dominant coalition and some of these rents helped to overcome market failures 
that had limited investments in the past. At the same time political stability was 
achieved by rent allocation to other powerful constituencies. As the composition of 
this coalition changed over the years, so did the balance between growth-enhancing 
rents and other types of rents. Till the 1980s, two types of rents played an important 
function in keeping the dominant coalition together while also supporting growth. A 
major part of the rents required for political stabilization were generated by politicians 
who controlled the state’s sugar ‘lobby’ in rural north-west Maharashtra. The 
generation of a significant part of the rents required for political stabilization in 
agriculture indirectly protected the capitalist sector in manufacturing as politicians did 
not need to extract rents from them. As the immediate rents required for running 
politics came from agriculture, politicians could look to industry for longer term 
relationships and rents, and this too contributed helping the capitalist sector in 
manufacturing. These relationships worked through patron-client networks where 
politicians would grant businesses favors like land or subsidies for industrial projects 
in exchange for relatively small immediate payoffs but with the understanding that 
business would stand behind particular politicians. As politicians were not heavily 
dependent on rents from business to finance their survival, the terms of these bargains 
were ‘business-friendly’ and helped the rapid industrialization of the state.  
 
These arrangements became vulnerable with the political fragmentation that affected 
Indian politics from the 1980s onwards. Maharashtrian state politics became equally 
fragmented and ruling coalitions were less able to take a long term view in developing 
relationships with business interests. The key players in the state now include the 
mainline Congress, the rightwing but mainstream Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a key 
breakaway faction of the Congress, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), the 
nativist/communal Shiv Sena (SS), and a subsequent splinter group of the Shiv Sena 
that is a swing player in elections. Some smaller parties based on caste affiliations 
also exist. These divisions have made the state’s political landscape volatile and 
unstable, especially over the last fifteen years. 
 
This was also the period when the Bombay underworld and crime syndicates became 
more assertive and conflicts between syndicates began to have an impact on violence 
in the city. Different ‘communal’ organizations also came to the fore, using religious 
politics, among other things, to engage in slum clearance and land grabbing. Bombay 
began to suffer more than its share of riots, bombs and religious violence. This was 
partly driven by wars between underworld gangs. It was also partly driven by the 
growing strength of communal organizations like the Shiv Sena who sought to 
mobilize poor Hindus against ‘outsiders’ to create new power bases at a time when 
the collapse of the old politics left spaces to be filled (Katzenstein et al. 1997, Lele 
1995). These processes contributed to the decline of industrial and manufacturing 
growth rates in Maharashtra after 2000 and the growth of service sectors like finance 
and software with lower sunk costs that did not require the same level of trust in the 
long-term stability of political arrangements. 
 
6.2.1 The alliance of industry and sugar 
Maharashtra was formed in 1960 after demands for a separate Marathi-language state 
were accepted by the central government. The state was earlier part of the Bombay 
Presidency that also included the current state of Gujarat. While capital had been 
controlled mostly by non-Marathi speaking industrialists, political power in the state 
was with Marathi speaking leaders who first came to prominence in the last decades 
of India’s Independence movement. The early mobilization for a separate state in the 
erstwhile Bombay Presidency was based on the mobilization of Maratha peasants (a 
particular caste within the broader Marathi-speaking population). Thus, the tension 
between a Marathi political elite and a largely non-Marathi business elite was an 
incipient problem from the founding of the state. 
 
For most of the next fifty years political stability and economic growth in 
Maharashtra was based on balancing the significant rents generated by the sugar cane 
'lobby' for political entrepreneurs while leaving enough rents for the industrial sector 
in Mumbai. The sugar lobby consisted of powerful Maratha leaders who kept out 
most other castes and political groupings from the state’s politics for a long time. The 
Maratha caste is an ‘intermediate’ caste and has significant power as a provider of 
political organizers. The name should not be confused with the Marathi language 
which is spoken by two-thirds of the state’s inhabitants and is the native language of 
the region. Maratha politicians created rents for sugar cane growers (and indirectly for 
themselves) in regions that voted Congress by setting higher prices at which sugar 
cooperatives would buy cane from growers. Maharashtra accounts for close to 30 per 
cent of India’s sugar production and about 99 per cent of this comes from the state’s 
sugar co-operatives (Bavadam 2005). This makes the control of the sugar 
cooperatives a key part of the redistributive politics of the state. The losses for the 
cooperative’s processing activities due to higher cane prices were in turn covered by 
complex public subsidies and debt write-offs as these Congress politicians also had 
power at the centre (Lalvani 2008, Kumar 2004).  
 
As Congress politicians distributed their patronage in the areas devoted to growing 
and processing sugar these parts of Maharashtra (the Nasik and Pune belts) become 
more developed. Ironically, this was one reason why the Bharatiya Janata Party and 
the Shiv Sena were eventually able to gain a firm footing in the impoverished eastern 
regions of Maharashtra called Vidharbha and Marathawada that did not benefit from 
this redistributive politics.  Each sugar cooperative is governed by a board of directors 
headed by a chairman. For instance the Malegaon Sugar Factory, owned by one of the 
foremost Maratha politicians in India, Sharad Pawar, has ten thousand member 
families. On a crude but plausible calculation, if there are just two members of voting 
age in each family, one of Pawar’s cooperatives alone would provide at least 20,000 
voters for his party, the Nationalist Congress Party, an ally of the Congress at the state 
and centre. In fact, the cooperative would be likely to gain many more votes because a 
broader economy is indirectly dependent on sugar rents. Moreover, politicians like 
Pawar would often own several factories. A large number of Maratha politicians were 
involved in running sugar cooperatives and collectively the swing votes they 
controlled gave them a substantial hold on power over several decades (Jenkins, 
1999). The numbers explain why the sugar cooperatives were important simply from 
a numerical electoral logic. 
 
The price of sugar cane has been an important part of the Congress electoral equation, 
a way of rewarding its farmers for their electoral support. In eastern Maharashtra, 
where Congress had a very weak base, factories could not offer the higher cane prices 
that prevailed in the West (Lalvani 2008). The price support policies are justified in 
terms of protection for poorer cane farmers but the differences between prices that 
cooperatives close to the ruling coalition could offer compared to other cooperatives 
shows that these were rents generated by powerful politicians to reward their 
supporters (Banerjee et al. 2001, Kulkarni 2007). Part of the price differential also 
benefited the politicians directly because many of them owned the factories that were 
the conduits through which government subsidies were allocated to sugar farmers. It 
must be noted though that higher cane prices did not necessarily mean prosperity for 
sugar farmers. Prices were generally low and what mattered for political support was 
the difference in price between cooperatives.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 
DIFFERENCES IN CANE PRICE BETWEEN REGIONS 
 
YEAR                REGION        CANE PRICE (Rs/metric tonne) 
1999-2000           West                      679 
                      East                      542.6 
                      Difference (W-E) 136.4 
 
2000-2001           West                      782.6 
                      East                      621.8 
                      Difference (W-E) 160.9 
 
2001-2002           West                      736.2 
                      East                      611.8 
                      Difference (W-E) 124.4 
 
2002-2003          West                      730 
                     East                      601.9 
                     Difference (W-E)       128.1 
 
2003-2004          West                      715.8 
                     East                      681.4 
                     Difference (W-E)       34.5 
 
Average           West                     782.72 
                      East                     611.9 
 
Source: Lalvani (2008) table A II 
 
Table 1 shows that cane prices in the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)-Congress 
strongholds of western Maharashtra were consistently higher than in the east where 
the combine was not very successful electorally. Procuring the cane at consistently 
high prices would ordinarily mean putting pressure on the cooperatives’ cash flows 
but anecdotal evidence suggests this did not happen. Finances are usually controlled 
by the cooperative’s chairman and their family members. The payout is usually made 
from medium term working capital loans given by the Maharashtra State Co-operative 
Bank which also lends to various District Central Co-Operative Banks. In fact 
according to Lalvani (2004) the state government indirectly shoulders the costs of 
these subsidies. Government-run financial institutions have extended close to a further 
Rs 21 billion as medium term loans to the factories. Loans to powerful politicians that 
were not paid back not only allowed them to pass on some of the rents to their 
electoral supporters in the form of high prices, but may also have allowed them to 
skim some of the rents for themselves. While very successful for a long time, this was 
clearly not a viable permanent strategy. Towards the end of the 2000s, close to 71 
factories out of around 200 were declared sick (Kaur 2007). The private sector began 
to enter the sector in a small way and began to buy up a few sugar co-operatives. The 
likelihood is that the system of manipulating rents in the ‘sugar lobby’ is coming to a 
close.  
  
This complex circuit of funds created a significant part of the rents that sustained the 
dominant coalition in the state, particularly during the period of the basic LAO. The 
sugar ‘lobby’ was led by ministers and policy makers who also served as senior 
functionaries in the state’s district cooperative banks that extended the loans. They 
were also the politicians who ran the sugar cooperatives in the areas where higher 
prices were offered. For instance, in 2004, the chairman of the Pune District Co-
operative Bank owned several large sugar cooperatives. And this pattern was 
replicated for most of the sugar cooperatives in western Maharashtra (Kumar 2004). 
Most of Maharashtra’s key political leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who have been 
associated with the sugar industry come from western Maharashtra—68 out of a total 
of 93 key political personalities (Lalvani 2008). The sugar rents gave Congress a firm 
base in Western Maharashtra up to the late 1970s, which we described as the basic 
LAO period, and the sugar rents persisted well beyond that period (Palshikar and 
Deshpande 1999). 
 
This rural support base was never in conflict with the capitalists in Bombay. In fact 
this apparently wasteful rent creation created a temporary swathe of rural prosperity 
and provided enough political stability to give politicians a longer time horizon that 
was important for their relationships with industry. The Congress politicians running 
the basic LAO had both the incentives and the political space to organize land and 
other resources for businesses in manufacturing at a reasonable ‘price’ in terms of the 
rent-sharing arrangements with industry. Thus, industrial capitalists indirectly 
benefited greatly from the stability as they too got rents from this political order 
through land grants, financial subsidies and prioritized infrastructure provision. This 
in turn enabled them to take a long term view on their investments. The rapid growth 
of the industrial sector testifies to this. Maharashtra, with around ten per cent of 
India’s population, contributed 22 per cent of the net value added in India’s organized 
industrial sector in 2007. This balance of interests between two very disparate 
groupings sustained the dominant coalition in Maharashtra for close to two decades.  
 
The relationships between businessmen and politicians in the early years of industrial 
policy could therefore work on a long-term basis rather than on a deal by deal basis. 
Favors did not have to be traded over particular projects because politicians were not 
desperate and could themselves take a long-term view with their business partners. If, 
for example, a minister was asked for an industrial license by a businessman with 
whom there was a long-term relationship, it was likely to be granted without an 
upfront payment on the basis of the favor being returned over time. Thus, industry in 
Maharashtra had the leeway to make long term investments and spread risks across 
projects without having to pay for each decision. These long-term arrangements were 
also helped by the fact that the stability and staying power of Maharashtra’s Congress 
politicians gave them considerable say at the centre, and the state was the largest 
beneficiary of the license regime, getting one of the largest numbers of industrial 
licenses over time. But as Table 2 shows, manufacturing growth rates declined after 
2000, coinciding with the ongoing reconstruction of the LAO in the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 
GROWTH RATES: GDP, INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE, SERVICES 
 
Growth Rates % India Maharashtra West Bengal World 
 
GDP  
     
1980-85            5.2     3.9              4.6             2.5 
1985-90            6.3     7.4              4.4             3.7 
1990-95            5.2     8.5              5.8             2.3 
1995-00            5.7    11.6              7.0             3.2 
2000-05            6.7      9.1              6.8             2.8 
1980-2005            5.6      8.9              5.8             2.9 
 
Per Capita GDP      
 
1980-85            3.0     1.8               2.4             0.8 
1985-90            4.2     5.0               2.2             2.0 
1990-95            3.4     6.4               3.9             0.8 
1995-00            3.9     9.6               5.4             1.8 
2000-05            5.2     7.5               5.5             1.5 
1980-2005            3.7     6.8               4.0             1.4 
 
Agriculture      
      
1980-85             3.4     0.8               6.2              1.5 
1985-90             4.2     7.9               4.8              0.8 
1990-95             3.1     3.6               5.8              0.6 
1995-00             2.3     2.5               3.4              2.2 
2000-05             2.4    -1.8               2.6              1.6 
1980-2005             2.9     3.4               4.6              1.2 
 
Industry      
      
1980-85  5.9          3.4               2.2              1.4 
1985-90            8.0     7.4               4.4              3.9 
1990-95            5.9     5.5               5.1              1.5 
1995-00            4.8     5.8               6.8              2.7 
2000-05            7.2     4.1               4.4              2.0 
1980-2005            6.2     5.6               5.2              2.5  
 
Manufacturing     
      
1980-85            7.1    2.9               1.9              na 
1985-90            8.1    8.1               4.6              na 
1990-95            7.1    5.8               3.2              na 
1995-00            4.3    6.0               7.3              na 
2000-05            6.7    3.5               3.8              na 
1980-2005            6.4    5.8               4.5              na 
 
 
Services      
  
1980-85                6.1               6.6   5.3    2.8 
1985-90                6.9               7.1   4.3    3.6 
1990-95                6.7               9.3   6.8    2.6 
1995-00                8.2               7.8   9.1    3.4 
2000-05                8.1               9.0   9.9    2.7 
1980-2005                7.1               8.0   7.1    3.1 
 
na=not available 
Source: Khan (2008c: Table 2). 
 
The benefits for the industrial sector can be understood by looking at how they in turn 
benefited from the rent regime during the basic LAO. An important source of rents for 
industry during this period was the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation 
or MIDC. MIDC was the largest Public Sector Unit (PSU) owned by the state 
government in Maharashtra. It facilitated industrial investment in the state by 
operating a simple rent-creation model. It purchased land cheaply using the support of 
local Congress politicians when necessary which it then sold or leased at a higher 
price to emerging industry. But this price was still significantly lower than the market 
price if investors had to acquire land using their own devices. The strategy therefore 
provided rents to the MIDC, its political masters, and to the industrialists who 
benefited from the land allocation. MIDC became an effective political tool in the 
hands of ministers and bureaucrats in charge and they used it to buy and bestow 
favors. But overall, these rents ensured high industrial growth for the state. It was in 
any politician’s interest to have an MIDC estate in his or her constituency rather than 
not. It provided jobs and raised the value of the lands which belonged to the large land 
owners. The downside is that it decimated small land owners through eminent domain 
purchases or purchases using subtle political pressure and converted many marginal 
farmers into landless drifters. 
 
The Congress was able to follow these policies because Maharashtra is essentially a 
non-agricultural state with a relatively impoverished and therefore politically weak 
peasantry. Only sixteen per cent of its farmland is irrigated and the monsoon typically 
fails in over 60 per cent of the state. Irrigated land gravitated towards cash crops like 
sugar. The only effect of a conscious focus on industry was that inequality in the state 
remained high. Poor farmers outside the dominant coalition could not initially 
organize themselves and political organizers from elite groups were initially not 
interested in organizing this group for their political advantage. It is possible that the 
easy availability of sugar rents made the Maratha elite in the Congress and NCP 
ignore other political constituencies (Vora and Palshikar 1996). Other types of 
redistributive policies, like the state government’s Employment Guarantee Scheme 
that formally operated in Maharashtra long before the central government introduced 
it across India, were not properly implemented. But the sugar lobby could not 
accommodate a big enough section of the elites and in the absence of populist 
redistributive policies, the Congress coalitions began to lose their electoral grip on 
power. By 1995 a BJP-Shiv Sena coalition won power and formed its first 
government in Maharashtra (Jadhav 2006). 
 
6.2.2 Congress Fragmentation and the Rise of the Shiv Sena 
In the 1980s, Maharashtra’s politics witnessed dramatic changes. A nativist 
movement was spearheaded by the Shiv Sena (SS), literally the army of Shiva, a 
Hindu god. The party later became openly and militantly communal and anti-Muslim, 
and gained ground in the state. It was especially strong in Mumbai and in the more 
impoverished regions in the east of the state. They mobilized groups, particularly the 
poorer groups and the urban unemployed that had been left out of the Congress 
coalition. The Congress itself became more factionalized and the other opposition 
party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), aligned with the SS given their ideological 
moorings in Hindu fundamentalism. 
 
The rise of the BJP-SS combine reflected a combination of four factors. First, there 
was a growing dissatisfaction with the Congress’s rigid and access-restricting politics. 
The opposition parties were successful in cobbling together coalitions of castes that 
the Congress had overlooked. In India’s political lexicon, these included some Other 
Backward Classes (OBCs) and a section of the Marathas, both of whom were seeing 
rising levels of economic prosperity thanks to industrialization but had limited access 
to political rents. But the new BJP-SS coalitions left out the Muslims and the Dalits 
(the ‘lower castes’). Table 3 shows how the SS made inroads into the ‘upper 
intermediate’ caste base of the Congress, into its Maratha, Kunbi and OBC base. 
Second, the Congress strategy gave it access to a limited stream of rents and other 
parties began to access much greater potential sources of rents. Businesses with long-
term investment plans could only provide limited immediate kickbacks to their 
Congress patrons. The rents from sugar and the kickbacks from productive investors 
could only accommodate a limited number of the potential groups who demanded a 
share of political rents. New parties who could mobilize rents from criminals, 
speculators and a host of new quick-return investors in real estate and other sectors 
could provide significant kickbacks immediately and could organize new groups who 
had been previously excluded. Third, the opposition took advantage of a growing 
‘vernacularisation’ based on the rising identification of Marathis of all castes with 
Marathi linguistic nationalism (Hansen 1996). Finally, local issues, both social and 
economic gave rise to a specific Hindutva agenda that led to the popularity of the Shiv 
Sena. The communally charged social and political environment in India during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s helped parties with a right wing communal agenda in 
Maharashtra. 
 
Table 6.4 
CASTE COMPOSITION OF VOTERS FOR MAJOR PARTIES IN 
MAHARASHTRA (figures in percentages) 
 
CASTE GROUP  CONG ’96    CONG ’99     SS ’96      SS ‘99     BJP ‘96      BJP ’99      NCP ‘99 
Maratha                   20.5          19.6     30.4          30.5        6.3                 19           31.5 
Kunbi                   10.6            7.1     21.6         20        15.3     13.7           16 
OBC (Non-Kunbi)  28.4          21.4     30.4         34        32.4     32.7           20 
Scheduled Castes      6.6          15.4       3           3         5.4                    2             8.2 
Scheduled Tribes      6.6            7.5       1           2         9                    5.2             4.1 
Others                   27.7          28.9     13.4        10.5      31.5                  27.5           20.2 
Source: Palshikar (2004), table 9 
 
The traditional business-government relationships in Maharashtra came under severe 
stresses as a result of these changes. Apart from its new caste coalitions, the SS 
typified the criminal-politician nexus thanks to its involvement in Mumbai’s 
underworld. The very tradition of business buying into political power was subverted 
when the criminal underworld began to play the same game. This period was an 
inflexion point for Maharashtra’s patron-client politics. As the Indian economy 
liberalized Maharashtra’s advantage in getting industrial licenses became irrelevant. 
Maharashtra had to compete with other states for industrial investments based on what 
its state government could offer in terms of infrastructure and hidden subsidies. By 
the late 1970s the industrial licensing system had practically broken down and by the 
1990s the formal procedures of licensing had largely disappeared. With the seismic 
changes brought about by the fragmentation of the Congress and a new more fluid 
ruling coalition based on allocating rents from a variety of sources to a broader 
coalition of castes, Maharashtra found it difficult to offer investors significant or 
stable rents over time. The services sector saw a spurt in this period that has 
continued, particularly services related to construction and real estate as the new 
politics facilitated land grabs from slums and squatters in a city with one of the 
highest urban population densities in the world: 27,715 persons per square kilometer 
in 2001 according to the government of Maharashtra. 
 
Mumbai’s real estate prices rival New York and London, the high prices reflecting a 
combination of demand and intense speculation. This has encouraged an increasing 
involvement of Mumbai’s underworld in real estate. Deregulation meant smuggling 
operations had become less lucrative hence attention turned towards real estate 
speculation. Businessmen and politicians were forced to take sides with different 
underworld gangs engaged in slum clearance and the city went through a violent 
phase that ended in a series of bomb blasts and communal riots. According to some 
observers the riots of 1993 were an expression of the fight to control Mumbai between 
two underworld groupings, one Muslim and the other Hindu. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the Hindu grouping was linked to the Shiv Sena while the Muslim 
remained without any apparent mainstream political links in the state. This violence 
does not mean Maharashtra was a fragile LAO during this period. It was a mature 
order where openness was not based on a rule of law but on contestations for 
dominance which occasionally turned violent. 
 
The underworld’s links with business date back at least to the economic troubles of 
Bombay’s famous textile mills which started closing down in the 1980s. Realizing 
that they were sitting on very lucrative real estate, many mill owners had simply 
refused to invest in modernization. The government of Maharashtra and sections of 
the underworld wanted a piece of that real estate pie. The labor conflicts that were the 
ostensible cause of the mills shutting down were often engineered by gangland 
hoodlums to make it easier for the mills to shut down, which they ultimately did. In 
1961, the mills employed more than 250,000 people. Today, there are 58 working 
mills employing a mere 20,000 people. While this deindustrialization and the shift to 
services had similarities with transitions in advanced economies, this was happening 
in a labor-surplus developing economy.   
 
The much closer involvement of the underworld in politics proved to be an important 
inflexion point for Maharashtra’s patron-client politics. Even though the SS-BJP 
combine was voted out in the assembly election in 1999, the NCP-Congress combine 
that succeeded had to recognize the new model of rent creation and coalition building. 
The more fluid and opportunistic set of rent opportunities and alliances that defines 
post-1980s politics in Maharashtra has many features of a mature LAO with much 
greater formal and real opportunities for setting up new political organizations and 
with its economic organizations targeting new types of rents. The NCP and the 
Congress in the 2000s did not and could not go back to the old LAO. They have 
instead developed their own links with the underworld. This was an easier and faster 
way to get access to the significant rents that were required for binding together 
restive coalitions than the long term model of business-government relationships and 
sugar lobby rents. It is not surprising that media reports of extortion and ‘protection 
money’ being collected by underworld groups and their links with political bosses 
have been growing. 
 
6.2.3 Summary 
Maharashtra remains a leading industrial state in India and a politically sophisticated 
state with keenly contested local elections and significant mass movements. Yet its 
political evolution has come at a cost as the polity has become more fragile and 
fractured since the 1980s, and industrial growth is no longer providing the necessary 
growth in employment. The state also has one of the most impoverished regions in 
India, Vidharbha, which gradually became a base for a violent Maoist movement 
spreading across central and eastern India. In the 1960s and 1970s when Maharashtra 
had features of a basic LAO, the distribution of rents achieved political stability but 
also ensured politicians had a longer time horizon that helped growth in the industrial 
sector. The changes that in the construction of the LAO that began in the 1980s 
contributed to a decline in the manufacturing growth rate by the 1990s. The growth in 
the service sector compensated for some of the slowdown in industrial growth but the 
aggregate growth of the state was dragged down by the continuing poor performance 
of its agriculture.  
 
The emergence of features of maturity in the LAO in Maharashtra thus had complex 
features. While political competition had adverse effects on the time horizon of 
politicians and the deals that business could expect, this also coincided with the 
liberalization that forced business organizations that were already sufficiently 
sophisticated to further enhance their competitiveness through global links and 
acquisitions. Nevertheless, Maharashtra began to lose ground to states like Tamil 
Nadu and Gujarat when allocations of industrial licenses were no longer decided by 
the central government and investors were free to choose locations. Other states were 
providing more incentives to attract investment and Maharashtra failed to come up 
with a competing package that was sufficiently attractive. Given significant industrial 
base the state had already achieved, initiatives like its comprehensive industrial policy 
package of 2001 did keep a flow of industrial investments going. Nevertheless, the 
political base underpinning these policies had become much more vulnerable.   
 
The important point in the evolution of the LAO in Maharashtra is that the transition 
from a basic LAO to an LAO with significant characteristics of maturity does not 
necessarily mean that there has been a simultaneous improvement in economic and 
political prospects across the board. Maturity was characterized by easier entry for 
both political and economic organizations. Some of these organizations were 
sophisticated economic organizations like the Indian automobile companies with 
production facilities in Maharashtra. Other entrants, particularly new parties in the 
political arena or shady construction companies were far less sophisticated, and 
sometimes generated significant negative externalities and occasionally induced 
violence. The dominant coalition was now based on the outcomes of intense political 
contestations that verged on the violent at the margins. Compared to the basic LAO 
that preceded it, Maharashtra’s politics is likely to remain more volatile and more 
violent given the rent allocation system that underpins the new LAO with 
characteristics of maturity and greater vulnerability. 
 
6.3 West Bengal 
At the time of independence, West Bengal, along with the Bombay Presidency was 
one of the most industrially advanced states in the country. Today while Maharashtra 
and Gujarat, the two states emerging out of the Bombay Presidency have retained 
their rankings as India’s top industrial states, West Bengal has slipped close to the 
bottom of the list of major states. The partition of India affected the state of West 
Bengal very significantly, as Bengal was split into Indian West Bengal and East 
Pakistan, later to become Bangladesh. Bengal had closely linked markets, and the 
partition sundered them in a manner that took West Bengal (and Bangladesh) years to 
recover, and never fully. Even though West Bengal was the industrial part of Bengal, 
East Bengal (later Bangladesh) was its hinterland providing markets and agricultural 
raw materials, in particular raw jute for the jute industry centered in West Bengal. 
 
West Bengal differed significantly from Maharashtra in the way in which the 
dominant coalition was constructed. The dominant coalition in Maharashtra was 
based on a combination of business interests and the sugar lobby. In contrast, the Left 
coalition that emerged as the dominant coalition in West Bengal used redistributive 
rents to a more dispersed set of elites within the state’s impoverished agrarian 
community who in turn created an unassailable electoral constituency for the Left 
Front led by the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM). Even though this rent 
distribution system ignored industrialization and industrial capitalists, it provided 
political stability for three decades. The basic LAO was thus constructed differently 
and lasted for longer in West Bengal. 
 
But as agricultural growth started petering out in the 1990s, the electoral constituency 
that underpinned the rent allocation strategy of the CPM began to become 
increasingly restive. While the Left Front did read the warning signs it read them a 
little too late and ended up trying to force through an industrial agenda to make up for 
lost time. The change in strategy was responding to the demands for jobs and 
prosperity coming from its core constituency but the support for industry required 
land acquisition for industry and other policies that alienated critical parts of this 
constituency and strengthened the hand of an opportunistic opposition. In the 2000s, 
the state witnessed mass mobilizations against land acquisition for industrialization 
and this resulted in the loss of a potential auto project in the state despite the project 
being strongly supported by the Left Front government. In this case, the success of the 
Left in constructing a stable dominant coalition ultimately turned out to be inimical 
for the long term growth prospects for industry in the state.  
 
6.3.1 A Congress government that never struck roots 
The basic LAO in West Bengal was untypical because Congress was weak in the state 
and the strong version of the basic LAO in state was constructed by the CPM. During 
the Nehruvian phase when India as a whole had characteristics of a basic LAO, a 
Congress government did hold power in West Bengal but it was weak and the state 
was never a significant recipient of industrial licenses despite being one of the two 
most industrialized states in the country. Some analysts have suggested that Nehru 
had a poor political relationship with the first chief minister of West Bengal and as a 
result the state effectively got punished. Except for a break in this pattern in 1969, 
Maharashtra always got at least double the industrial licenses of West Bengal. This 
partly reflected the better organization of Maharashtrian capitalists and their ability to 
buy influence from politicians, a feature discussed in our section on Maharashtra.  
When the new Left Front government took over in 1977, the already neglected 
capitalist sector found it even more difficult to get a voice in the state government as 
the new coalition focused on rent allocation to and electoral support from a rural 
constituency (Banerjee et al. 2002). Moreover, the access of the Left Front 
government to the centre was even worse than the preceding West Bengal Congress, 
as the central Congress and other coalition governments did not share a comfortable 
relationship with the Left Front. And while the basic LAO at the centre fell into crisis 
from the mid-1960s, West Bengal bucked the national trend as the Left Front 
consolidated a stronger version of a basic LAO at the state level in the late 1970s. 
This created a single dominant party which had a rent distribution strategy that was 
sufficiently effective to make it electorally unassailable for three decades before it too 
faced growing crises by 2010.  
 
During the early Congress years, the state did get some public sector investments such 
as an integrated steel plant and a few mega hydroelectric power projects but these 
were insufficient to sustain a drive towards industrialization. With India still a basic 
LAO, the poor relationship of the state Congress with the central Congress meant that 
despite being one of the industrial leaders in 1947, the state got significantly fewer 
industrial licenses compared to Maharashtra (Table 4). Nor did capitalists in West 
Bengal have close relationships with leaders in the national Congress. This too was 
different from capitalists in Bombay. The most important difference was that the West 
Bengal Congress did not have a state-based rent strategy that allowed them to 
consolidate a basic LAO. There was no equivalent of the sugar lobby in West Bengal 
and the Congress here found it much more difficult to construct a stable coalition 
compared to the Maharashtra Congress. 
 
Table 6.5 
 
INDUSTRIAL LICENSES ISSUED TO DIFFERENT STATES IN INDIA, 1965–76 
 
                  1965  1966  1967 1968  1969   1970   1971   1972   1973   1974  1975   1976 
AP                  24     19      11       4        6     13       37        30       29      61        61       51 
GU                 39     33      29     23      16     39       66        57       78       89       97       83 
TN                  59     29      18       7      12     36       51        36       64       99     141       61 
MH               134   109    100     66      80    112    162       131    183      265    255      143 
PN                 24      31     16     14        7      39      45         52       44     107    109        52 
WB                64      42     48     34      62      46       81        54       47     107      74        56 
 
 
Source: Raychaudhuri and Basu (2007), table 11  
Note: The abbreviations for the states are as follows- AP = Andhra Pradesh, GU = 
Gujarat, TN = Tamil Nadu, MH = Maharashtra, PH = Punjab & Haryana, WB = West 
Bengal. 
 
The Congress-based dominant coalition collapsed earlier in West Bengal, by the late 
1960s. It fragmented enough for the first non-Congress coalition, a Communist one, 
to come to power. The first coalition did not last long but the stage was set for a Left-
oriented coalition in the state. The Congress government that came to power after this 
short-lived coalition brutally put down a popular leftist movement. The movement, 
called ‘Naxalite’ was the result of a peasant uprising in 1967 which struck not just at 
the Congress coalition but also divided the Communist movement in West Bengal. 
The emergence of the Naxalite movement was itself in part a manifestation of the 
unraveling of the Nehruvian basic LAO in West Bengal and the inability of the 
Congress to offer rents to potential organizers of violence in the state. 
 
6.3.2 The Left Front: prioritizing agrarian over industrial interests 
The Left won a landslide victory in 1977 and was quick to consolidate its position 
among its rural constituents by focusing on land reforms and the establishment of the 
‘Panchayati’ system of local self government. The Panchayat level is the lowest level 
of elected government in India and operates through the devolution of administrative 
power to the level of a village unit. These actions helped the Left mobilize a large 
section of the rural and largely agricultural support base that it was to draw on for the 
next three decades (Mukherjee 2007). The Panchayati system came into force in the 
state almost a decade before it was adopted at the national level and proved to be the 
Left’s political masterstroke. Once the Left won Panchayat elections in a village it 
could appoint its cadres to run the administration on party lines ignoring the 
bureaucratic district administration authorities that were more difficult to command 
along partisan lines. This gave Panchayat members significant powers over rent 
allocation at the village level, for instance in the allocation of public funds. The land 
reforms on the other hand gave the Left the much needed perception of using state 
power for a progressive social transformation (Yadav 2006). 
 
Land reform in West Bengal distributed very little land to the poor but it did 
strengthen the rights of sharecroppers and landless workers. The most substantial 
effect was to enable a shift in the state’s rent distribution strategy towards subsidies 
for fertilizers, tube wells and other investments for the small and medium peasants 
who made up the bulk of the peasantry (Rogaly et al. 1999). The shift in rent 
distribution priorities was both politically successful in creating a constituency for a 
stable ruling coalition as well as being developmental for a time and driving strong 
growth in West Bengal’s agriculture (Table 2). The source of stability was that the 
allocation of small rents to a broad population of small and medium peasants gave the 
party an unassailable electoral constituency while also helping peasants to drive high 
rates of agricultural growth for a while. The way in which the dominant coalition was 
constructed, however, meant that the coalition could ignore the importance and indeed 
necessity of allocating rents to develop industry. On the contrary, the Left at this time 
actively encouraged militant trade unionism in the cities to keep potential 
industrialists and their Congress supporters in check, while basing its own power on a 
stable coalition based in the rural economy. 
 
The Left Front therefore created a second, and apparently more successful basic LAO 
compared to the one the Congress had constructed in West Bengal. However this 
strategy had its limitations. First, agricultural growth based on the middle peasantry 
had its shortcomings in terms of political stability. The really poor and landless were 
left out, as were the growing ‘intermediate classes’ in the urban areas, except for those 
who were incorporated as party activists and organizers. Second and perhaps more 
importantly, agricultural growth in a land-scarce economy had its economic limits. 
When in the 1990s agricultural growth started petering out, the Left Front faced very 
serious problems in reorienting its strategy towards industry. 
  
The Left’s ability to use the Panchayati system effectively through the 1980s and 
most of the 1990s to direct rents to its constituents was an important part of its rent 
allocation system. Most local developmental activities were funded through this 
system and bypassed the bureaucracy of the district administration. This allowed the 
Front to gain a head start over other Indian states in streamlining the process of funds 
disbursal through the Panchayati system. Channeling funds for local development 
projects through the Panchayats helped the Left to decide allocation politically, 
bypassing the bureaucracy of the district administration. This was a vital part of the 
mechanism through which it consolidated its cadre base at the grass roots level. Party 
members were members of the Gram (village) Panchayat and so at the grassroots 
level, the party and government structure coalesced. The allocation of development 
funds not only provided rents to the core organizers of the party, but to a significant 
extent were also developmental rents as they provided subsidies for investment in 
agriculture that otherwise might not have happened. Money disbursed went to 
villagers who either had organizational capabilities or to win over those who were 
hesitating in their support for the Left. Winning a majority in every Panchayat 
election helped to consolidate the Left’s base which was translated into money and 
muscle during state and national elections (Bhattacharya 2002, Mitra 2001).  
 
The developmental aspect of this rent allocation strategy resulted in a significant 
growth in agricultural productivity. Between 1980 and 2005, the average agricultural 
growth rate in West Bengal was 4.6 per cent as opposed to 2.9 per cent for India and 
3.4 per cent for Maharashtra (Table 2). As Rogaly et al. (1999) show, a large part of 
the subsidies resulted in increased investments in tube wells, fertilizers and other 
agricultural inputs. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) also argue that the distribution of 
agricultural kits and credit to poor farmers contributed to higher productivity. In 
Khan’s terminology, these were developmental rents (Khan 2008c). Given that not 
much land was redistributed and tenancy reforms were limited, these developmental 
rents are likely to have been an important contributor to West Bengal’s higher than 
average agricultural growth over this period. 
 
The flight of industry 
The Left-organized basic LAO in West Bengal coincided with, and possibly at least 
partly caused a flight of organized industry from West Bengal to Maharashtra and 
other states. It began with a number of corporate headquarters being shifted from 
Kolkata to Mumbai. The basic LAO created by the Left left no space for industrial or 
capitalist interests. Industrial corporations offered no opposition to these pro-agrarian 
policies; they clearly felt there would be little point in fighting such a well organized 
political order. The corporate interests that stayed behind were typically family owned 
organizations in commodity businesses like tea and jute, unlike the blue chips whose 
bottom lines were being hit by industrial unrest and limited policy and incentive 
support from the state.  
 
For industrial companies, the lack of support for investment translated into low firm-
level productivity growth and ultimately adverse effects for shareholders. In contrast, 
owner-capitalists in commodity businesses required less support and were also much 
more adept at maintaining cozy relations with the CPI-M’s top leaders. Yet till the 
early 1990s the Left Front blamed West Bengal’s industrial decline on New Delhi’s 
antagonistic policy towards states ruled by opposition parties. This argument became 
weaker after the ‘liberalization’ or economic deregulation policies that the Congress 
and later governments at the centre implemented from 1991 (Sinha 2004). As the 
allocative decisions of the centre became less important, the Left Front government 
found it more difficult to explain why industrial performance in West Bengal 
continued to lag in the new economic regime. To make matters worse, agricultural 
growth in the state also began to taper off at around the same time. 
 
6.3.3 The Limits of the Left Front 
While the Left’s pro-rural, anti-capitalist rent-creation strategies paid political 
dividends for two and a half decades, towards the end of the 2000s there were signs 
that the strategy had reached its limits. As late as the 2003 elections the CPI-M won 
2,303 out of a total of 3,220 panchayat seats. But this fell to 1,597 in 2008, while the 
opposition which won 744 seats in 2003 increased its position to 1,479 seats in 2008. 
The CPM also suffered serious electoral reverses in the 2009 general elections. At the 
heart of its difficulty was a significant slowdown in agricultural growth in the state 
and the challenge of shifting to an industrial strategy at a late stage. 
 
The limits to agricultural growth in West Bengal stem from an adverse person-to-land 
ratio and small farm sizes which make mechanization impractical. The average 
cropping intensity (the number of crops grown every year) is one way of raising 
output, but this is already 1.78 in West Bengal, second only to Haryana. The person-
to- land ratio is three times the Indian average. The growth that could be achieved 
initially with these small peasant farms by pumping in more inputs clearly had its 
limits. Even this growth did not really make a significant dent on poverty at the 
bottom (Sarkar 2007). The dominant coalition began to realize that further rapid 
growth would require addressing much more difficult issues like significantly 
improving rural infrastructure and land consolidation to enable mechanization. At the 
same time, the dominant coalition ran into problems with its own constituency in 
trying to promote industrialization. 
 
Since 2007 West Bengal witnessed massive protests and violence directed at the Left 
Front against its land acquisition strategy to assist industry. Belatedly, when the Left 
Front realized that it had to promote industry, its strategy of trying to provide cheap 
land for industrial investors failed because it was unable to acquire this land without 
significant violence. Plans for building a car manufacturing plant in the state by the 
leading Indian auto maker, Tata Motors, had to be dropped because of the ferocity of 
the protests, spearheaded by a resurgent opposition taking advantage of the pent-up 
frustration against the CPI-M. The frustration is partly of the CPI-M’s own making. 
The party’s tight control of allocative decisions down to the village level is a feature 
of this basic LAO. But party control that is so intrusive means that there is no choice 
of schools, villagers cannot make their own decisions about where to take co-
operative loans, and so on. The single party LAO in a context where a challenge by 
the opposition cannot be formally blocked by administrative methods can only work if 
the benefit from higher growth and material welfare is perceived by the electorate to 
compensate for the more extensive control over choices and rents. When agricultural 
growth was rapid, these conditions were met and for well over two decades the Left 
Front was unassailable at the polls. But this dramatically changed with the decline of 
agricultural performance, and particularly after the mid- 2000s. The Left Front 
suddenly faced the unexpected specter of losing in the rural areas where electoral 
battles are really won and lost in West Bengal. Nor was the left equipped to create a 
new pattern of rents that could support broad-based small and medium scale industrial 
capitalism which could satisfy the dual goals of industrial employment generation and 
moderate equity consistent with its support base. 
 
An ever hopeful and watchful opposition caught on to the dissent and sought to turn it 
to its advantage. The opposition campaigned successfully to block the Left Front 
strategy of acquiring agricultural land for industry. These mobilizations are likely to 
have a lasting negative effect for whoever wins power in West Bengal because the 
challenge of supporting industrialization is not going to disappear. Greater openness 
in political access is likely to make it even more difficult to address these difficult 
issues. At the same time, the unraveling of the Left Front LAO has also led to many 
of the poor and displaced being mobilized by violent insurgency movements like the 
Maoists. A dormant Maoist movement has been rejuvenated in the state and was 
following a path of considerable violence by 2010. While drawing support from the 
Maoist insurgency in the rest of the country, the movement in West Bengal also draws 
support from the vast section of the state’s tribal population that was largely 
overlooked by the Left Front. Finally, the unraveling of this basic LAO has further 
harmed the state’s industrial performance to a greater extent than Maharashtra 
because the size of the manufacturing sector was smaller to begin with and the 
challenge in West Bengal was to attract new investments, not just to enable existing 
clusters to grow. 
 
6.3.4 Summary 
West Bengal appears to be a case of missed opportunities. The Left had thirty years of 
uninterrupted rule, a feat not seen before and very unlikely to be repeated in India’s 
current political environment. It succeeded in building up a loyal constituency and a 
committed cadre base that worked hard at the rural grassroots. The conventional 
explanation of the Left’s failure is that it neglected social investment in education and 
primary healthcare and squandered its goodwill. More important perhaps was its 
failure to formulate a strategy beyond agriculture growth. Agriculture could not in any 
case absorb a younger generation who no longer wanted to be involved in the sector. 
But it also took its constituency for granted and failed to develop support for difficult 
decisions. When the Left Front attempted to forcibly acquire land for industry, it paid 
the price by losing heavily in the general elections of 2009. 
 
Behind all these explanations is a broader problem: the strategy of rent creation and 
allocation that underpinned the Left Front’s basic LAO had significant problems. This 
strategy did not allow the growing intermediate classes avenues for rapid integration 
into the dominant coalition and access was severely limited to loyal supporters. It 
ignored the really poor and left them to be organized by disenchanted intermediate 
class political entrepreneurs. And its rent allocation strategy did not provide industrial 
interests with growth-generating rents until it was too late. By the end of the 2000s, 
the Left found itself in the unenviable position of losing the confidence of its 
traditional constituency and with no other support base to fall back on (Khan 2008c). 
 
 
6.4 A Comparison and Conclusion 
The evolution of the LAO in Maharashtra and West Bengal has to be understood in 
the context of changes happening across India, but they also exhibit critical regional 
differences which are just as important. In both cases, the state-level differences in the 
construction of their dominant coalitions implied significant differences in the types 
of rents and their allocation. These differences help us to make sense of differences in 
economic and political strategies, as well as the challenges the states faced. 
 
As North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) point out, institutions and organizations have 
a path-dependent history. Some of the most important institutions and organizations in 
Maharashtra revolved around industry. The state’s dominant coalition was built to 
accommodate the urban industrialists and the rural rich. After independence the 
dominant coalition was kept together by two distinct types of rents. Long-term rents 
for industry assisted investment and technology acquisition, initially through the 
licensing system, and also through land acquisition through the MIDC, the 
prioritization of infrastructure and other interventions. In return, the industrialists 
were expected to provide kickbacks to politicians. But the most important rents that 
kept the dominant coalition in political business were damaging in a narrow economic 
sense but nevertheless provided political stability. These rents included the rents 
created by the pricing policies of the sugar lobby that provided the rents for a patron-
client politics focused on Maratha political organizers and their electoral clients. As 
this basic LAO evolved, the long term rents to industry became more difficult to 
sustain, and political competition became more fragmented and violent. The growth 
of communal politics and the criminalization of politics that happened in Maharashtra 
in the 1990s tracked the changes at the all-India level towards greater maturity in the 
characteristics of the LAO. Long-term investment in industry suffered, but industry 
already had a deep enough base to carry on investing on its own.   
 
In West Bengal the Congress-led LAO ended a lot earlier, followed by a new Left-led 
LAO that had significantly different characteristics. Unlike the Congress-led basic 
LAO of the Nehru period, the Left-led basic LAO was organized through a mass 
party. It incorporated many but not all potential organizers, and as a result open 
competitive violence was much less in evidence in West Bengal during this period 
compared to other states. However, the nature of this dominant coalition ruled out 
rents that attracted productive investments in industry. The coalition’s productive rent 
allocation focused on small and medium peasants, and for a time greater investments 
by middle peasants in particular drove significant agricultural growth. However, when 
agrarian growth hit a ceiling due to land fragmentation and population density, the 
dominant coalition could not shift rent allocation strategies sufficiently to attract a 
significant increase in industrial investment. The growing violence and insurgency in 
the late 2000s in West Bengal reflects the gradual breakdown of this basic LAO. As 
West Bengal moves towards ‘maturity’ it also faces uncertainty in terms of the nature 
of the coalitions that will emerge and their rent allocation strategies. 
 
Both states are at different stages of moving from more stable basic LAOs to much 
more volatile mature LAOs. In Maharashtra this has already progressed, in the form 
of the emergence of new coalitions, such as the BJP-SS led coalition of excluded 
elites, with an attendant increase in political instability. In West Bengal the electoral 
defeats of the Left Front in 2008 and 2009 probably signal the beginning of a 
transition to a more mature LAO in the sense that the space for establishing new 
organizations, particularly political organizations, is likely to significantly increase as 
a result. It has also resulted in an upsurge in insurgent violence led by Maoists. The 
emerging maturity in the LAO in both West Bengal and Maharashtra has therefore 
been associated with greater violence and political fragmentation. 
 
West Bengal comes off poorly when compared to Maharashtra in terms of industrial 
growth but leads if we compare agricultural performance. West Bengal also enjoyed 
uninterrupted political stability for 30 years and did more to target poverty while 
Maharashtra suffered from more fractious politics, more serious communal strife and 
did less to fight poverty even during the basic LAO phase. But West Bengal used its 
political organizations to create rents that supported agricultural growth in a context 
of pressing land scarcity where sustaining growth required an industrialization 
strategy. In Maharashtra industry and commerce flourished, even if the breakdown of 
the basic LAO resulted in a slowdown in industrial and particularly manufacturing 
growth in the late 1990s. 
 
Taken together our examination of the LAOs in West Bengal and Maharashtra 
demonstrate a few principles and raises many questions. First, the transition to 
maturity in India according to the NWW  definition appears to have very strong 
political determinants. In particular, the basic LAO of the Nehruvian period failed 
because the ruling coalition could not accommodate all the potential organizers and 
violence specialists who emerged. The LAO with greater characteristics of openness 
and therefore maturity was simply a response to these pressures, rather than being 
driven by the growing sophistication of productive organizations. Fortunately for 
India, small sectors of the economy were also growing in organizational 
sophistication, particularly the organized industrial and service sectors that were 
globally competitive. But these were still sectors that employed tiny numbers of 
people as a share of the total population. 
 
Secondly, while our case studies corroborate the important role of violence and the 
need to distribute rents to maintain political stability in LAOs, the role of the violence 
specialist needs closer scrutiny. Receiving rents does not necessarily make a violence 
specialist stop violence. They may instead ask for more rents. The perpetual splitting 
of parties sometimes happens because political organizers are unhappy with the rents 
they are getting, not because they are not getting any. Similarly, being excluded from 
rents does not necessarily induce an organizer to engage in violence. We do not know 
ex ante what the rent allocation should be to stop violence or whether the current 
allocation is excessive or insufficient. This is a weakness in terms of policy advice to 
developing country leaders. But the framework can describe the evolutionary process 
through which stability is achieved in developing countries. 
 
Finally, in developing countries like India where the mobilization of the intermediate 
classes for rent capture is an ongoing and expanding process, the transition to aspects 
of a mature LAO can and does result in greater volatility and perhaps vulnerability. 
India has evolved towards a political and economic system where many types of 
organizations can be set up and function successfully outside the ambit of the 
dominant coalition. However, the very ease with which organizations can be set up 
can destabilize the rents of the dominant coalition and threaten its viability. If the 
dominant coalition hits back with restrictions, it reverts to having more characteristics 
of a basic LAO. If it gives in, it can create incentives for even more organizers to try 
and capture rents and result in an outbreak of violence and fragility. Till an extensive 
and productive capitalist class is created that can pay for the protection of basic 
property rights, as well as pay significant taxes to allow stability to be achieved 
through fiscal redistribution, reaching the ‘doorstep’ conditions for establishing an 
extensive rule of law for elites in both political and economic organizations is not 
going to be easy.  
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